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Smith v. Van Gorkom Revisited: Lessons Learned in Light of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Florence Shu-Acquaye*
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1982 case, Smith v. Van Gorkom,' was a landmark decision in
the United States as it demarcated the requisites for a breach of the
fiduciary duty of care. The Delaware court found the board liable
solely for breach of its fiduciary duty of care to the corporation and
hence liable in damages to the plaintiff shareholders.2 Prior to this
decision, courts were very reluctant to hold boards liable for a breach
of their fiduciary duty of care, if the directors acted in good faith, in
the best interest of the corporation, and its decisions were not tainted
by fraud, illegality, or loyalty violations. Cases such as Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co.,3 Shlensky v. Wrigley,4 and Joy v. North,5 evidence this
precedent.
Van Gorkom, unlike the Enron case and its progeny, involved no
loyalty violations, fraud, or illegality on the part of the board of direc-
tors and management, presupposing similar outcomes. Instead, the
board of directors was found to have breached its fiduciary duty of
care, thereby losing the protection of the business judgment rule pre-
sumption and sending shockwaves through corporations across the
country. As a result, judges were urged to limit the applicability of
their decision to the facts of the case. Also, State legislatures were
lobbied to enact exculpatory provisions that limited or eradicated di-
rectors' liability for breach of its fiduciary duty of care; consequently,
insurance for directors and officers alike skyrocketed.
If the Van Gorkom decision had any impact in deterring manage-
ment and directors from negligent decision-making, then that deci-
sion, as well as subsequent decisions, state statutes, and rules of
* Associate Professor of Law at Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center.
I would like to thank Ms. Estelle Vavner for her excellent research assistance, and Ms. Cindy
Chungons for editing.
1. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
2. Id. at 864.
3. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
4. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
5. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982).
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corporate governance developed thenceforth, would have effectively
averted the recent wave of corporate scandals. Is the answer to be
found in a new law such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Act")? 6
How different is this Act from the current laws dealing with corporate
governance of boards of directors? Will this Act redress the prevail-
ing flaws in corporate governance policy?
Revisiting the case of Van Gorkom, in light of the Act, would reveal
any such distinctions and any evolution of the laws in corporate gov-
ernance. Also, assessing the role of each of the players in the case and
determining their individual liability under the Act would highlight
any similarities, as well as distinctions in the Act with prior laws.
This article critically evaluates the Van Gorkom decision by examin-
ing the overall conduct of the board of directors and management and
the corresponding effect on the fiduciary duty of care owed to the
corporation. The article also explores how the outcome of that deci-
sion could have been influenced by various provisions of the Act. For
example, section 301 of the Act requires that companies listed with
the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation ("NASDAQ") en-
gage an audit committee comprised solely of independent directors.
Also, section 305 of the Act expands the Security Exchange Commis-
sion's ("SEC") ability to remove directors and officers and bar them
from serving in similar capacities at other public companies by dem-
onstrating their "unfitness to serve." (The standard held prior to en-
actment of the Act only required "substantial unfitness.")
The NYSE also proposed additional amendments that would have
been compulsory for companies listed on the NYSE, which had the
potential to significantly affect corporate governance as we know it;
this included the requirement that an independent board of directors
be appointed. The effect of the relevant amendments is also ad-
dressed in this article.
Likewise, recent trends in exculpation provisions that limit or elimi-
nate directors' liability for breach of the fiduciary duty of care are also
examined. Presumably, these trends contributed significantly to the
determining characteristics of the new corporate governance policy in
the United States. Moreover, it has been said that the defining ten-
sion in corporate governance is that between deference to directors'
decisions and the scope of judicial review.7
6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
7. E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in America, 52 Bus.
LAw, 393, 403 (1997).
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Section II of this article revisits the facts of the Van Gorkom case
and examines the conduct of the major players. Section III focuses on
the fiduciary duty of care owed by the board of directors to the corpo-
ration, in view of the business judgment rule and subsequent judicial
review. Section IV analyzes the Act, as applied to the facts in Van
Gorkom. Section V discusses some of the intricacies of the indepen-
dent boards of directors. Whether the Act has added anything sub-
stantive to the fiduciary duty of care is debatable; however, weighing
both the pros and cons of the Act, taking into account the fiduciary
obligations of the boards of directors, would further elucidate the
discussion.
II. CONDUCT OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND MANAGEMENT
IN VAN GORKOM
The underlying problem in Van Gorkom concerned the corpora-
tion's inability to produce an adequate amount of taxable income to
offset its surplus of investment tax credits ("ITCs") 8 and the resulting
actions by management and the board of directors.
The key players in the case were Jerome W. Van Gorkom ("Van
Gorkom"), the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of the Trans Union
corporation9; Jay A. Pritzker ("Pritzker"), a corporate takeover spe-
cialist; Donald Romans ("Romans"), Chief Financial Officer ("CFO")
and top manager of the corporation; Bruce A. Chelberg ("Chelberg"),
president of Trans Union; the board of directors which consisted of
five inside10 and five outside directors", each of whom possessed sub-
stantial expertise; and James Brennan ("Brennan"), an attorney for
Trans Union.
Trans Union was a publicly traded company that received its princi-
pal earnings from its railcar-leasing business, which generated a cash
flow of hundreds of millions of dollars annually.12 Unfortunately, the
corporation was ineffective in generating sufficient taxable income to
offset its ever-increasing ITCs.13 Consequently, Van Gorkom, in coop-
eration with other capital intensive firms, lobbied Congress to have
8. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864.
9. Id. at 865-66. "Van Gorkom, a certified Public accountant and lawyer, had been an officer
for Trans Union for [twenty-four] years, its Chief Executive Officer for more than [seventeen]
years, and Chairman of its board for [two] years." Id. at 865.
10. Id. at 894. "... the inside directors had collectively been employed for the corporation for
116 years and had 68 years of combined experience as directors." Id. at 894.
11. Id. The outside directors had [seventy-eight] years of combined experience as directors
and as a group were employed with Trans Union for [fifty-three] years. Id.
12. Id. at 864.
13. Id.
2004]
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ITCs refundable in cash to firms which could not fully make use of the
credit. 14 Their efforts failed, however.15
At a subsequent senior management meeting, Van Gorkom ex-
pressed his desire to find a more lasting solution to the problem, other
than the corporation's recurrent practice of acquisition. 16 Among the
various alternatives discussed was the sale of Trans Union to a com-
pany that had a sizeable amount of taxable income.' 7 At this meeting,
Romans, Trans Union's CFO, stated that his department had per-
formed, at best, a tenuous forecast of the cash that the corporation
could potentially realize in the event of a leveraged buy-out.18
At a later senior management meeting, the issue of a leveraged buy-
out was further discussed as a possible strategic maneuver and as an
alternative to the company's acquisition program. 19 In preparation
for this meeting, Romans and Chelberg, Trans Union's president, for-
mulated rough calculations based on $50 per share and at $60 per
share to determine the cash flow needed to service the debt that could
result from a leveraged buy-out.20 While these calculations were not
intended to establish a fair price for the corporation or its entire stock,
the figures indicated that a leveraged buy-out at $50 per share would
be fairly easy to accomplish but extremely difficult at $60 per share. 2'
Although Van Gorkom expressed a willingness to take $55 for his own
14. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864.
15. See id. at 864-65.
16. Id. at 865.
17. See CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 108 (Teacher's Note 4th ed. 2003).
(1) Earning more pre-tax income against which to use its excess tax credits. This could
be accomplished by "growing" the existing Trans Union business or by buying up
smaller businesses that have excess taxable income;
(2) Finding a merger "partner" that had taxable income against which to offset the
unusable tax credits;
(3) "Selling out" to a larger firm that had excess taxable income which it wished to have
offset by Trans Union's tax credits;
(4) "Selling out" to a new set of managers who would then have the responsibility of
solving the investment tax problem/opportunity.
Id.
18. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 865. Apparently, this work was propelled by a media arti-
cle, which Romans had seen regarding a management leverage buy-out. Id. As Romans himself
stated, the work consisted of a "preliminary study," and his analysis of the work was that it "was
a very first and rough cut at seeing whether a cash flow would support what might be considered
a high price for this type of transaction." Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. It is worth noting that these calculations were neither extensive nor conclusive, and
were calculated without the benefit of experts. Id.
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shares, he vetoed the proposed management buy-out, as it involved a
potential conflict of interest.22
Nonetheless, Van Gorkom privately contemplated whether it would
be prudent for Trans Union to seek a privately or publicly-held pur-
chaser.2 3 He surreptitiously met with Jay Pritzker, a prominent corpo-
rate takeover specialist and social acquaintance, and proposed a $55
per share price for the sale of Trans Union and a financing arrange-
ment by which to complete the deal.2 4 Van Gorkom consulted with
neither the board members of Trans Union nor senior management,
before meeting with Pritzker.25 He did, however, meet with Trans
Union's controller, Carl Peterson ("Peterson"). 26 Van Gorkom in-
structed Peterson to calculate the practicability of a leveraged buy-out
at $55 per share, without providing any justification for his directive.2 7
This figure was concocted by Van Gorkom, based exclusively on the
availability of a leveraged buy-out, and unsupported by any compe-
tent evidence that $55 represented the actual per share value of the
company.28 Pritzker later confirmed his interest in the $55 cash-out
merger proposal and met over the next two days with Van Gorkom to
further discuss the proposed deal.29
During their negotiations on the next day, Van Gorkom and
Pritzker agreed upon a cash-out merger for one million shares of
Trans Union treasury stock at a price of $38 - 75 cents above the per
share price at the close of the market on the following day.30 Pritzker
22. Id. This would translate to $133 million ($75,000 x 55). And given that Van Gorkom was
almost 65 years old at the time and ready to retire, this alternative presented a more attractive
alternative to job preservation. See id. at 866. Also, at $35 per share (the highest pre-merger
agreement value in four years), Van Gorkom's shares were worth $2,625,000. Therefore, if Trans
Union was merged or sold at $55 per share, Van Gorkom would have realized approximately
$1,500,000 more than he would have received at current market value. The issue of whether
management is conflicted is based on the fact that the management's jobs may be at risk with a
management buy-out. The real question is whether Van Gorkom was conflicted at all as, if a
sale of some sort did not take place, he would be unable to recognize the greater value of his
shares. Therefore, he would be conflicted. In other words it could be that the best route for
Trans Union was to develop its inherent value in ways other than selling itself. On that decision,
Van Gorkom may have been more interested in the value from an immediate sale than the
shareholders would have been.
23. Id. at 866.
24. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 866. Van Gorkom met with Pritzker at his home. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. Van Gorkom told Peterson that he wanted no other person on his staff to know about
the deal he arranged with Pritzker. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 867. Chelberg, and Michael Carpenter, a Trans Union consultant, accompanied Van
Gorkom to these meetings. Id.
30. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 867. It is noteworthy that Van Gorkom and Pritzker had no
further discussions on the previous price of $55. Id.
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demanded that Van Gorkom obtain approval of the proposed merger
by Trans Union's board of directors within three days.31
Arrangements for bank financing were immediately made by Van
Gorkom, Chelberg, and Pritzker.32 Van Gorkom also retained an at-
torney, James Brennan, to consult with Trans Union on the legal as-
pects of the merger.33
In addition, Van Gorkom called a special meeting of the board for
the following day, without providing notice that the purpose of the
meeting was to discuss the proposed merger.34 Van Gorkom also
called a meeting of the company's senior management which was
scheduled to convene one hour before the special meeting of the
board.35
In ascertaining whether the fiduciary duty of care required of Trans
Union's board and management was upheld, and whether sound busi-
ness judgment was exercised, the manner in which the special meeting
of the board was conducted is of considerable significance. Therefore,
a discussion of this meeting follows. The special meeting of the board
extended over a two hour period.36 During the meeting, the board
was not provided with a copy of the merger agreement nor any other
written documentation concerning the merger; 37 instead, its knowl-
edge of the proposed merger was based entirely on a twenty minute
presentation by Van Gorkom, during which time he outlined the terms
of his offer to Pritzker.38 In essence, upon selling all of its outstanding
shares to Pritzker, for $55 in cash, Trans Union would effectively
merge into a new subsidiary that would be wholly owned by
Pritzker.39 It is noteworthy that Van Gorkom did not inform the
board of how he arrived at the price of $55.40
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 867. Van Gorkom did not consult with the head of Trans Union's legal department.
Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 869.
37. Id. at 868. Copies of the proposed merger agreement were delivered too late for study
before or during the meeting. Id.
38. Id. Van Gorkom discussed the problem with the depreciation deductions and ITCs. Id.
He also disclosed his initial meeting with Pritzker and his offer for a merger buy-out. Id. How-
ever, he did not disclose that he proposed a price for the sale of Trans Union's shares to Pritzker.
Id.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 869 n.9. In determining whether the $55 price was a true appraisal of the value
of the stock, an assessment of the market history of Trans Union's stock revealed that the merger
price represented a premium of 62% over the average of the high and low prices that the stock
[Vol. 3:19
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The proposed merger agreement also provided that Trans Union
could receive, but not solicit, competing offers for a ninety day pe-
riod.41 However, Pritzker had exclusivity of negotiation;42 therefore,
inside information could not be furnished to other bidders. 43 Van
Gorkom suggested that this period could serve as a market test and,
for all intents and purposes, would determine whether the $55 price
represented a fair offer for the company's shares. 44
The merger agreement was also conditioned upon Pritzker ob-
taining the necessary financing within a stated period. Also, whether
or not the merger was successful, Trans Union would be required to
issue Pritzker a warrant for one million newly issued shares at the
then-market price of $38.4 5
Van Gorkom argued that the issue before the board was not
whether $55 was the maximum amount that could be obtained for the
shares, but whether $55 was a fair price to be presented to the stock-
holders for their consideration. 46 Van Gorkom's position was sup-
ported by Chelberg, Trans Union's president, and Brennan, as legal
counsel, advised the board that if the offer was rejected, Pritzker
could sue, as a fairness opinion was not required. 47
Romans, who attended the meeting as CFO, informed the board
that his study suggested that $55 was a "rough" baseline for feasibility
of a leveraged buy-out.48 However, it was not indicative of a fair price
for the stock or a valuation of the company. 49 He nevertheless consid-
ered the price to be fair.50
traded for in 1980; a premium of 48% over the last closing price and 39% over the highest price
at which the stock had traded at any time during the preceding six years. Id.
41. See id. at 868.
42. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 868.
43. Id.
44. Id. Van Gorkom endorsed the position that putting Trans Union "up for auction" through
a ninety-day market test would validate the position of the board that $55 per share was a fair
price. Id.
45. Id. at 867. In other words, if Pritzker's financial conditions were met or waived by
Pritzker, Trans Union was required to sell to Pritzker one million newly-issued shares of Trans
Union stock at $38 per share.
46. Id. at 868. He told the board the free market would judge whether $55 was fair price. Id.
Van Gorkom claimed that, in short, all he was asking the board to do was approve the submis-
sion of the transaction to stockholders, who were the real decision makers. Id.
47. Id.
48. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 868-69. Romans told the board that the studies he conducted at
$50 and $60 were not intended to serve as the valuation of the company, but simply as the first
step towards reaching a conclusion on the company's value. Id.
49. Id. at 869.
50. Id.
2004]
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The merger agreement was executed by Van Gorkom and delivered
to Pritzker,51 but was subsequently amended, due to threatened resig-
nations by key officers of Trans Union.52 Van Gorkom also obtained
board approval on the amendments.5 3 However, the actual amend-
ments to the merger agreement, which were prepared by Pritzker, di-
verged significantly from Van Gorkom's representation of the
amendments to the board.54 In spite of this, Van Gorkom executed
the amendments to the agreement.55
After the buy-out was consummated, Trans Union's disgruntled
shareholders brought a class action suit originally seeking rescission of
the cash-out merger of Trans Union and alternate relief in the form of
damages. 56
The main issue in this case was whether the board of directors acted
with due care for the corporation and were hence protected by the
business judgment rule.
III. THE DUTY OF CARE AND THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
Because the business and affairs of a company are generally man-
aged by or under the direction of the company's directors, there is a
threshold standard expected from directors in carrying out these re-
sponsibilities, which consists of two basic functions: a decision-making
function and an oversight function. 57 The latter generally involves the
formulation of corporate policy and strategic corporate goals, while
the former concerns periodic attention to corporate systems and con-
trols, policy issues, or any matter necessitating a director's inquiry.
5 8
51. Id. This took place at a formal social event organized by Van Gorkom. Id. Neither he nor
any other director read the agreement prior to its signing and delivery to Pritzker. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 869. The amendments made it virtually impossible for Trans Union's board of direc-
tors to negotiate a better deal and withdraw from the merger agreement.
54. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 869. Van Gorkom signed the amendments without informing
the board of the discrepancies between his representations of the agreement and the actual
agreement and the resulting implications.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 863-64. This was a class action suit as opposed to a derivative suit. A derivative suit
is generally brought by the shareholders on behalf of the company. Hence, the true plaintiff in a
derivative suit is the company that has been wronged by the Board's failure to act with requisite
care and diligence. In this case, the shareholders have suffered a loss of their status as share-
holders of Trans Union, due to the board's failure to act with due care. Id. The shareholders
thus sought damages against the board, the subsidiary, New T, and its owners. Id.
57. The general threshold standard is that every director must discharge his duties in good
faith and in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the corpora-
tion. Florence Shu-Acquaye, The Taxonomy of the Director's Fiduciary Duty of Care: United
States and Cameroon, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. J. IN'T. & COMP. L. 585, 592 n.31, n.32 (2003).
58. For more discussion, see Florence Shu-Acquaye. See Corporate Director's Guidebook, 56
Bus. LAW. 1571, 1578-84 (3d ed. 2001).
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In carrying out their duties, directors are expected to act in good
faith, in the best interest of the corporation, and with the care that a
person in a similar position would reasonably believe appropriate. 59
In managing the affairs of the company, directors therefore owe a
duty of care to the company and its stakeholders. In some states, the
fiduciary duty of care is defined by judicial doctrine, whereas in other
states, the statutory formulations replace or supplement the common
law.60 For those states that have adopted the Model Business Corpo-
ration Act, Section 8.30 delineates the standards of conduct for direc-
tors by concentrating on the manner in which they perform their
duties and the level of performance expected of them in managing the
business dealings of the corporation.6t
In addition to their continuing duty to supervise and monitor the
affairs of the corporation, directors are also responsible for making
important business decisions. Courts invoke the business judgment
rule in assessing the conduct of directors and determining whether to
impose liability in a particular case. 62 The business judgment rule, as a
standard of judicial review, is the common law recognition of the stat-
utory authority that has been vested in the board of directors. 63
What exactly is the business judgment rule? It is a presumption of
regularity that the decisions of boards of directors are made after an
informed and reasonable investigation, in good faith, and with the
honest belief that the decisions were made with the best interest of the
corporation in mind.64
Although, the business judgment rule is designed to foster the com-
plete exercise of managerial power granted to directors, it is not an
59. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.30 cmt. (1998); see also Shu-Acquaye, supra note 57, at 592.
60. Under Delaware law, the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by
or under its board of directors. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2003). See also MODEL Bus.
CORP. AcT. § 8.30(b) (1998) (stating that "members of the board...shall discharge their duties
with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar
circumstances"). Tis standard is often characterized as a duty of care. See MODEL Bus. CORP.
Acr § 8.30 cmt. (1998). See also Shu-Acquaye, supra note 57, at 592.
61. Directors are expected to perform their duties in "good faith" and in a manner reasonably
believed to be in the corporation's best interest. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.30 cmt. (1998).
62. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.30 cmt. (1998).
63. MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003).
64. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (overruled on other grounds). The busi-
ness judgment rule serves as a shield which protects directors from liability for their decisions.
O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 17, at 285. Where it is found that the directors should
receive protection of the rule, the courts would not interfere with or second guess the directors'
decision. Id. If the directors are found to not be entitled to the protection of the business judg-
ment rule, the courts would then scrutinize the directors' decision to determine whether it was
intrinsically fair to the corporation and its shareholders. Id.
2004]
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unfettered power.65 Application of the business judgment rule is
based on a demonstration that informed directors did in fact make a
business judgment sanctioning the matter being examined. 66 A direc-
tor's obligation to inform himself, in preparation for his decision, de-
rives from the fiduciary capacity in which he serves the company and
its stakeholders. 67 Therefore, whether the directors' business judg-
ment was informed is determined by whether they took the necessary
steps to inform themselves of all material and relevant issues, prior to
making the business decision.68 Once this presumption is established,
the decision of the board is protected from judicial review of the
merits.69
Generally, courts are reluctant to second-guess the board's deci-
sions, as judges do not necessarily possess the business expertise and
skill of the board. 70 However, recent corporate scandals, as well as
the latest case decisions in Delaware, suggest that courts have height-
ened their review of director's conduct thereby putting into question
the validity of the business judgment rule.71
In Brehm v. Eiser, after reiterating the traditional formulation of
the business judgment rule, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that
"the concept of substantive due care is foreign to the business judg-
ment rule" and that "directors' decisions will be respected by courts
unless the directors are interested or lack independence relative to the
decision" or fail to consider material facts.72
The Delaware Chancery Court recently denied a motion to dismiss
an amended complaint against a board of directors arising from the
65. See generally Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 871.
66. Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971).
67. Lutz v. Boas, 171 A.2d 381 (Del. Ch. 1961).
68. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
69. See R. Franklin Balotti & Joseph Hinsey IV, Director Care, Conduct and Liability, 56 Bus.
LAW. 35, 37 (2000).
70. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (arguing
against substantive judicial review of the board); see also Shu-Acquaye, supra note 56, at 593.
This reluctance was also expressed in Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (Conn. 1982). There are
certain circumstances, however, which mandate that a court take a more direct and active role in
overseeing the decisions made and actions taken by the directors. Under such circumstances,
the court subjects the directors' conduct to enhanced scrutiny to ensure that it is reasonable,
before the protection of the business judgment rule may be conferred. See UNOCAL Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). See also WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., Busi-
NESS ASSOCIATIONs 36 (5th ed. 2004).
71. Over the past year, the Delaware Supreme Court has reversed Chancery Court decisions
in favor of defendant directors in the following cases: MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc.,
813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003); Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003);
Levco Alternative Fund Ltd. v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 803 A.2d 428 (Del. 2002); Saito v. McKes-
son HBOC, Inc., 806 A.2d 113 (Del. 2002); Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257 (Del. 2002).
72. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000) (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812).
[Vol. 3:19
SMITH V. VAN GORKOM REVISITED
same issue in Brehm that underlay the court's interpretation of the
business judgment rule.73 Although the Chancellor noted that it was
rare for courts to impose liability on directors for breach of the duty of
care, this was found not to be the case where the directors "failed to
exercise any business judgment and failed to make any good faith at-
tempt to fulfill their fiduciary duties to [the company] and its stock-
holders. ' 74 The court further concluded that the alleged facts
suggested that the directors "consciously and intentionally disregarded
their responsibilities, adopting a 'we don't care about the risks' attitude
concerning a material corporate decision. '75 Hence, the demand was
excused and the complaint was found sufficient to withstand the
motion. 76
Similarly, in a Seventh Circuit case, In re Abbott Laboratories De-
rivative Shareholders Litig., the court held that the directors' decision
to not act was not made in good faith, where they were aware that the
company had failed to comply with various safety regulations and
took no action.77
Likewise, the Delaware Chancery Court found that a special litiga-
tion committee, appointed by the corporation's board, was influenced
by considerations other than the best interest of the corporation in
concluding that the directors did not breach their duty to the
corporation.78
Whether the former treatment of the business judgment rule is on
the decline is questionable. However, the prevailing trend, in recent
decisions, is that a heightened level of judicial scrutiny will be applied
to the conduct of directors in managing the affairs of the company.
Therefore, in order for directors to lessen the likelihood of assuming
73. In re The Wait Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 291 (Del. Ch. 2003).
74. Id. at 278.
75. Id. at 289.
76. Id. at 289-90.
77. In re Abbott Laboratories Derivative Shareholders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 809 (7th Cir.
2003).
78. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 948 (Del. Ch. 2003). A special litiga-
tion committee (SLC), comprised of independent directors, was appointed by the corporation's
board to determine whether a shareholder derivative action should proceed for allegations made
that the CEO and other directors of the Oracle Corporation breached their duties to the corpo-
ration by engaging in insider trading. Id. at 923. The SLC moved to dismiss the derivative
litigation. Id. at 928. The Delaware Chancery Court noted that a personal relationship existed
between the SLC members and the defendants. Id. at 942. Also, the decision of the SLC was
probably motivated by economic interests; specifically, a $50,000.00 gift from one of the defend-
ants to a SLC member for delivering a speech at the defendant's request, and the possibility that
a $170 million donation would be made to the university where both SLC members taught by the
corporation. Id. at 943. The court concluded that the SLC's decision was motivated by material
considerations other than the corporation's best interest. Id. at 947.
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an increased risk of liability, they must be vigilant in demonstrating
good faith and informed decision-making. 79
In Van Gorkom, the lower court concluded that the board's ap-
proval of the merger fell within the protection of the business judg-
ment rule because sufficient time and consideration were given to the
proposal.80 The court's decision was based on its finding that the
board deliberated over the proposed merger on three separate occa-
sions.81 In short, the lower court propounded that Trans Union's
board acted neither "recklessly" nor "improvidently" in determining
the course of action it deemed best for the corporation.82 However,
on appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware reached a different
conclusion.
The standard of review utilized by the Delaware Supreme Court
involves an analysis of the complete record and a formulation of dis-
tinct findings of fact, where appropriate.83 In carrying out its power of
review, the function of the Supreme Court is to assess the competency
of the evidence and to test the suitability of the lower court's find-
ings.84 If the facts are adequately substantiated by the evidence and
are the result of an organized and logical deductive process, the deci-
sion of the lower court stands untouched.85 This is the case even
where the Supreme Court would have otherwise reached a contrary
conclusion; 86 the Supreme Court would only thus reach a conflicting
decision, when the findings below are undeniably incorrect and neces-
sitates a judicious reversal. 87
As discussed earlier, substantial deference is given to boards in ad-
ministering the business and affairs of a corporation.88 However, the
79. See Meredith M. Brown & William D. Regner, What's Happening to the Business Judg-
ment Rule?, 17 INSIGHTs 2 (2003). For instance, the directors should focus and decide on impor-
tant matters, identify and minimize conflict of interest, act on an informed basis, and rely on
experts when appropriate. Id.
80. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 870. Consideration was given to the merger agreement on Sep-
tember 20, 1980, October 8, 1980, and January 26, 1981. Id. The lower court, therefore, ruled
that in light of the market value of Trans Union's stock, the business acumen of the board, the
significant premium over market offered for the stock, and the ultimate effect on the merger
price by prospective bids for the stock, the board's action in reaching its decision on the merger
agreement was both efficient and controlled. Id. at 870-71.
81. Id. at 870.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 871.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 871.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2003); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del.
1984); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 805, 811; Zapada v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981).
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board's power is not unfettered. 89 Therefore, in measuring the actions
taken by Trans Union's board, in its approval of the merger agree-
ment, it is therefore necessary to first determine the legal governing
standard that the court considered in reviewing the conduct and prac-
tices of the board.
Principally, the governing legal standard is a demonstration that the
board upheld its fiduciary duty of care to the corporation and its
stockholders. 90 This obligation is protected by the business judgment
rule, provided that the board acted on an informed basis, in good
faith, and in the honest belief that its actions were made in the best
interest of the corporation. 91
A business judgment will be considered to be informed when it can
be shown that the directors educated themselves of all material facts
before rendering a business decision.92 In other words, a board's due
care to the corporation and its shareholders is paramount. Conse-
quently, the business judgment rule does not afford protection to di-
rectors who exercised "unintelligent" or "unadvised judgment," 93 or
who submitted to "faithlessness, fraud, or self-dealing." 94
These latter conditions were not found in Van Gorkom.95 The court
also stated that the fulfillment of the fiduciary duty requires more
than the mere absence of fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing (a breach of
the duty of loyalty).96 Instead, a duty of care must prevail.
The court further conceded that, in prior cases, various terms were
used to explicate the applicable standard of care, 97 but nevertheless
concluded that, under the business judgment rule, a board's liability is
based on the theory of gross negligence. 98 The court also reasoned
that the appropriate standard for determining whether a business
judgment was informed hinges upon concepts of gross negligence. 99
89. See generally Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 871.
90. Id. at 872.
91. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; see also Kaplan, 284 A.2d at 124.
92. Kaplan, 284 A.2d at 124.
93. Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass Co., 167 A. 831, 833 (Del. Ch. 1933). The court in this
case asked the question of whether the board acted "so far without information that they can be
said to have passed an unintelligent and unadvised judgment." Id. See also Gimbel v. Signal
Companies, Inc., 316 A.2d 599, 615 (Del. Ch. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974).
94. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
95. Id. at 873.
96. Id. at 872.
97. Compare Mitchell, 167 A. at 833 (indicating that the standard is whether the board passed
an unintelligent and unadvised judgment), with Gimbel, 316 A.2d at 619 (describing the standard
as a finding that the board acted "without the bounds of reason and recklessly" in reaching its
business decision).
98. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873.
99. Id.
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Did the directors' actions measure up against this standard, as a
matter of law? In order to answer this question, one must consider
the actions of the board in making its decision on the merger
agreement.
By plotting some of the sign posts referenced in the decision, it can
be shown that the directors failed to act with informed and reasonable
deliberation. 100 To illustrate this point, the directors were grossly neg-
ligent in approving the cash-out sale of the corporation after having
deliberated for only two hours, without prior notice of the proposal,
and without being provided with some basis for the existence of an
emergency. 10 1 The board was also presumably negligent in failing to
obtain any documentation concerning the proposed merger agree-
ment10 2 despite insufficient evidence of its terms, outside of Van
Gorkom's two hour oral presentation. 10 3 In addition, the board acted
negligently in not obtaining sufficient documentation to support Van
Gorkom's representation of the value of the corporation. 0 4
Moreover, directors may not overcome the presumption that they
negligently agreed to the valuation of the company 0 5 by relying on
their collective experience with the company'0 6 and on the fact that
the price represented a substantial premium over the prevailing and
historical market prices. 10 7
100. The court summarily concluded that the board did not reach an informed business judg-
ment in voting to sell the company for $55 per share pursuant to the cash-out merger proposal as
follows: (1) the directors did not adequately inform themselves of Van Gorkom's role in forcing
the sale of the corporation and in determining the per share purchase price; (2) the directors also
failed to inform themselves of the intrinsic value of the corporation; and (3) the directors ap-
proved the "sale" of the corporation after two hours' consideration, with no notice given of the
proposed "sale," and with no suggestion that an emergency or crisis existed. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d at 874.
101. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874.
102. Id. The directors had nothing before them other than Van Gorkom's statement of his
understanding of the substance of the agreement, which he admitted to having never read. Id.
Directors should insist on recesses to obtain adequate information, rather than deciding without
the benefit of such information.
103. Id.
104. See id. The directors were given no documentation to support the adequacy of the fifty-
five dollars price per share for the company. Id.
105. Adequate documentation of the value of the company could have easily been obtained
by simply asking the company's chief financial officer to conduct a valuation study. Alterna-
tively, the board could have commissioned an outside valuation study.
106. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875.
107. Id. The directors argued, inter alia, that the board's decision was informed because of the
magnitude of the premium difference between the $55 Pritzker offer and Trans Union's current
market price of $38 per share, and that the adequacy of the premium was conclusively estab-
lished by the market over a 90 to 120 days period. Id. at 875, 878. This argument was rejected by
the court because, even though a substantial premium could potentially provide some basis for
the suggestion of a merger, with the absence of sufficient documentation to support the actual
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Also, the outside directors did not involve their inside management
or outside investment bankers, who generally propose such mergers
and related transactions, and who were familiar with the internal af-
fairs of the corporation, prior to authorizing the merger agreement.
10 8
This does not mean that, as a matter of law, the board is required to
obtain a fairness opinion by outside investment specialists. 10 9 How-
ever, given the fact that the Trans Union board also failed to request
that its CFO conduct a valuation study or, at minimum, review the
proposed merger agreement, the board lacked sufficient evidence that
its authorization of the agreement was informed, such that it could
make a sound business judgment. 1 0
The court also questioned the efficacy and utility of the market test
which was proposed as an estimation of the value of the corpora-
tion." l Although the market test was not a requisite of an assertion
that the directors exercised good business judgment, they were none-
value of the company, a premium by itself is inadequate justification for its proposed value. Id.
at 875. Also, there was no evidence to support a finding that the merger agreement was effec-
tively amended to give the board the option to put the company up for auction sale to the
highest bidder, or indeed that an auction was likely to occur. Id. at 877.
The court also rejected the board's purported reliance on a study conducted by a consultant
group (BCG study) and a Five Year Forecast in support of the adequacy of the $55 per share
price because the board made no reference to these studies in any of its meetings in which the
merger agreement was addressed. Id. at 875. Also, these studies were not an adequate repre-
sentation of a customary valuation study. Id. In addition, the board was aware that the market
had consistently underestimated the value of Trans Union's stock. Id. at 876.
108. This failure is even more significant because none of the directors, management, or
outside directors were investment bankers or financial analysts. In view of this, the meeting in
which the cash-out merger was authorized should have been recessed to permit them an oppor-
tunity to obtain additional information from inside management (Romans, CFO) concerning the
adequacy of the offer or from the company's investment bankers (Soloman Brothers) whose
merger and acquisitions specialist was well known to the board and who was familiar with the
company's affairs. Id. at 877. Also, directors who, in the performance of their duties for the
company, rely in good faith on records and reports of their officers, managers, independent
certified public accountants, and appraisers are fully protected. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)
(2003).
109. The court concluded that an outside valuation study was not essential to support a find-
ing that the board made an informed business judgment. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 876. In
addition, fairness opinions by independent investment bankers are not required as a matter of
law. Id.
110. The board, besides failing to realize that Van Gorkom had suggested the $55 price to
Pritzker, also did not realize that the price was based on calculations that were designed solely to
determine the feasibility of a leverage buyout. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 877. Accordingly, the
court reasoned that had the directors made an inquiry of their CFO of the particulars of his
valuation study, it would have been duly informed that the study merely offered a rough calcula-
tion of the company's value and was not determinative of its fair value and therefore was inade-
quate. Id.
111. Van Gorkorn, 488 A.2d at 878.
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theless required to ensure that the test was neither deceptive nor
disingenuous.112
In light of the foregoing, the court held that the directors breached
their fiduciary duty of care to the company and stockholders by failing
to inform themselves of all material information in determining
whether to approve the merger agreement. 113 The court also con-
cluded that the board of directors' approval of the merger agreement
was uninformed as it lacked sufficient valuation information to reach
an informed business judgment on the fairness of the proposed
merger cash-out. 114 Accordingly, the directors' decision did not fall
under the protection of the business judgment rule.
The question then turns to, what would the results be when a board
is stripped of the protection afforded to it under the business judg-
ment rule? Once the business judgment rule presumption is pierced,
upon a showing that the directors breached their fiduciary duty of
care,' 15 the burden of proof shifts to the board of directors. The board
of directors must then demonstrate that the decision was intrinsically
fair to the company and therefore warranted protection.
In other words, the board must meet the two-part "fairness test"
delineated in Weinburger v. UOP, Inc.116 The first prong of the "fair-
ness test" is a demonstration that the transaction was the result of fair
dealings by the board of directors.'1 7 The second element is met, if it is
112. Van Gorkom argued that even though the merger agreement incorporated a market test
component, it nonetheless precluded the company from actively soliciting such offers and from
providing any further information about the company to interested parties. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d at 878-89. It was also the contention of the directors that they believed the entire financial
community would be informed of the sale of the company, once the proposed cash-out merger
was announced. Id. In addition, several of the outside directors maintained that they under-
stood the agreement to mean that if they obtained a better offer, they were within their right to
accept it. Id. However, the court found that because the merger agreement did not give the
board the right to put the company up for auction, nor was the agreement amended to permit a
market test and the right to accept a better offer, the director's reliance on the market test as the
basis for accepting the merger agreement was unfounded. Id.
113. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 880.
114. At no time did the board request a valuation study, taking into consideration the com-
pany's assets. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 877. Neither did the board take time to review the
proposal. Id. Additionally, the board accepted, without question, Van Gorkom's representation
as to the fairness of the fifty-five dollar price. Id.
115. After the Van Gorkom decision, such breach includes a showing that the directors made
an important decision without being adequately informed.
116. Weinburger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
117. Id. at 711. Fair dealing encompasses questions of when the transaction was timed; how it
was initiated; how the negotiated was structured; the manner in which the transaction was dis-
closed to the directors; and how the approval of the directors and shareholders was obtained. Id.
Whereas fair price deals with the economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger,
including such relevant factors as the market value of the assets, future earnings prospectus, and
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shown that a fair price was obtained.1i8 As illustrated above, the
board in Van Gorkom failed to satisfy both prongs of the fairness
test.119
The dissent gave deference to the judgment and experience of the
directors, however. 120 They argued that due regard should be given to
both the inside and outside directors because of the magnitude and
extent of their business experience and the length of their cumulative
service with Trans Union.121 The dissent also maintained that the in-
side directors were well qualified and collectively could not have been
taken in by a "fast shuffle,"'122 and further that the dissent also con-
tended that, because the directors were sufficiently informed of the
business and affairs of Trans Union, they were more than adequately
qualified to make a quick business judgment concerning the sale of
the corporation. 123
Whether Van Gorkom could have been taken in by a "fast shuffle"
is debatable. However, the court found that the collective experience
and expertise of the directors was undermined by their failure to make
a reasonable and informed decision on the proposed merger. 124 This
factor purportedly calls for even stricter scrutiny in today's boards,
especially given the fact that significant emphasis is placed on the di-
rector's stature. This contention is further developed in the discussion
below on the impact of the Act. Even so, the court concluded that the
competence and sophistication of Trans Union's directors was over-
shadowed by astounding evidence of their gross negligence in approv-
ing the merger agreement.
any other factor that could affect the intrinsic value of the company's stocks. O'KELLEY &
THOMPSON, supra note 17, at 258. (Emphasis added.)
118. Weinburger, 457 A.2d at 711. (Emphasis added.)
119. There was no fair dealing as the directors arrived at the decision to sell the corporation
without any due diligence. Likewise, the price was not fair because an actual market test would
have been a better measure of market value than an appraisal of the company's worth.
120. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 894.
121. Id. The five inside directors had collectively been employed by Trans Union for 116
years and had 68 years combined experience as directors. Id. The five outside directors were
considered comparably competent with them having 78 years of combined experience as chief
executive officers and 53 years of cumulative service as Trans Union directors. Id.
122. Id. The dissent pointed out that "directors of this caliber were not ordinarily taken in by
a 'fast shuffle."' Id. Also, directors of this business acumen and expertise were completely cog-
nizant of the state of affairs, especially as it pertained to the entire corporate appraisal of Trans
Union. Id.
123. Id. at 895. The dissent contended that the corporate world operates on a "fast track,"
conditions to which the Trans Union directors had become accustomed. Id.
124. Id. at 880. The court found that the directors' reasons for accepting the proposal was
undermined by Van Gorkom's contention that the director's collective experience and sophisti-
cation was a sufficient basis for finding that the board reached its decision with informed, rea-
sonable deliberation. Id.
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The Supreme Court remanded the case for a determination of the
fair value of the shares, based on the intrinsic value of Trans Union at
the time the cash-out merger was approved, as well as an award in
damages. 125 It has been argued that the more appropriate measure of
the value of the stock was its market value, the price that would have
been eventuated from an open auction.1 26 This posture was taken be-
cause there was no other bid for the Trans Union stock higher than
that of the cash-out merger offer. The court was therefore forced to
conclude that the measure of damages was that price that the directors
would have been able to extract if the board had done its job prop-
erly.12 7 For example, if the intrinsic value of the company was found
to be $65 per share, the directors' liability would have been
$133,577,580. Given this risk, the directors settled the case by agreeing
to pay a mere $23,500,000; most of which was paid by the corpora-
tion's insurers and the Pritzker group.
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF THE DECISION IN VAN GORKOM
The Van Gorkom decision sent shockwaves through corporate
America. Its ramifications impacted the potential effect of serving on
corporate boards,1 28 due to directors' heightened vulnerability to lia-
bility for breach of the fiduciary duty of care.129 Also, in the after-
math of the decision, premiums for directors and officers have sharply
increased.1 30 Further, many legislatures have enacted exculpation
provisions that limit and sometimes eliminate directors' liability for
breach of the fiduciary duty of care. Beginning with Delaware in
1986,131 over forty states have such provisions. The following sets
125. Why remand with instructions for a hearing on damages, rather than instructions to first
hold a hearing to determine whether the defendants could carry their burden of proving the
transaction's entire fairness? As shown above, the transaction was neither fair to the corpora-
tion; nor was there fair dealing. Hence, the only issue to remand to the lower court was the
amount of damages to be accessed. CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, COR-
PORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 258 (4th ed. 2003).
126. Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van
Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1, 4 (1985).
127. Id.
128. Following the decision, directors were reluctant to serve on boards. Also, even where
they chose to serve, they were overly cautions out of fear of being sued. This is an issue which
invariably may impact the value of the stockholder.
129. The protection provided by the business judgment rule was lessened, whereas, the risk of
unnecessary interference or second-guessing of directors' judgments was increased.
130. Manning, supra note 127, at 6. The availability of directors' and officers' insurance was
curtailed as insurers dropped out of the field and policies were canceled. Id. Consequently, the
shortage of insurers meant an exodus of independent directors from corporate boards. Id.
131. The Delaware statute is also known as the charter option statute, which authorizes corpo-
rations to adopt such provisions in its certificates of incorporation. See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON,
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forth both the Delaware and the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act ("RMBCA") provisions.
Section 102 of the Delaware statute, with some exceptions, elimi-
nates or limits the personal liability of directors for monetary damages
for breach of their fiduciary duty of care to the corporation or its
stockholders. 132 This provision does not, however, cover liability for
breach of the duty of loyalty, acts or omissions that were not made in
good faith, or which involves intentional misconduct or violation of
the law, or transactions from which the director derived an improper
personal benefit.
Based on this issue, one would expect that stockholders would
avoid investing in companies incorporated in Delaware if the statute
actually protects directors from liability. This has not been the case,
however. Such may be the result because investors simply do in fact
condone some negligence from the board.
In this same vein, in 1990, the American Bar Association Commit-
tee on Corporate Governance incorporated exculpation provisions in
section 2.02 of the RMBCA. 133 In contrast to the Delaware statute,
the RMBCA also covers directors' liability for breach of the duty of
loyalty. 34
V. THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT, THE NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE RULES AND IMPACT OF THE ACT
The stock market crash of the late 1990s, compounded by the re-
lentless spread of financial fraud found in many large public corpora-
tions, prompted a need for corporations to rethink corporate
governance policies in this country.1 35 As a result of the incidence of
supra note 17, at 252. The effect of the provision is to allow shareholders to remove breach of
duty of care as a cause of action for damages. See id.
132. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (b)(7) (2004).
133. REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 2.02(b)(4) (2001).
134. Id. What may not be covered (exceptions) by the charter option statute is what distin-
guishes many of the statutes from each other. But the Delaware statute and that of fifteen other
states contain the following exceptions: 1) breach of the duty of loyalty to the corporation or the
stockholder; 2) acts or omissions not in good faith; 3) intentional misconduct; 4) knowing viola-
tion of the law; 5) improper distribution; and 6) any transaction from which the director derived
an improper personal benefit. REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 2.02(b)(4) cmt. (2001).
135. "Sarbanes-Oxley and the proposed NYSE listing standard amendments are intended to
prevent future corporate abuses and corruption. But the reforms served a more immediate pur-
pose than promoting good corporate governance. Beyond the merits of specific proposals, a
strong regulatory response was needed to boost investor confidence. Simply by doing some-
thing, Congress and the NYSE showed that there was a cop on the block and that fraud and
corporate corruption would not be tolerated." Troy A. Parades, Enron: The Board, Corporate
Governor, and Some Thoughts on the Role of Congress, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND
THEIR IMPLICATIONs 519 (Nancy Rapport & Bala Zharin, eds., Foundation Press 2004). Others
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fraud, affected shareholders and employees encountered massive
losses.
Also, the unforeseen and shocking demise of companies, such as
Enron, Adelphia Communications, WorldCom, Quest, and a few
others, propelled Congress to approve the SEC's recommendation to
pass the Act of 2002 as a means to boost investors' confidence. 136 Sec-
tions of the Act that are applicable to this discussion are outlined
below.
One of the major innovations of the Act was the creation of a Pub-
lic Company Accounting Oversight Board ("Oversight Board") which
oversees audits of public companies that are subject to the securities
laws. The principle purpose of the Oversight Board is to protect the
interests of investors, and to engage public interest in the preparation
of informative, accurate, and independent audit reports. 137
The duty of directors to be informed is covered under section 301 of
the Act. As discussed earlier, corporate law imposes upon directors a
duty of care, which manifests itself in the form of a monitoring func-
tion and stems from the principle that all corporate affairs must be
managed under the direction of the board of directors. 138 This moni-
toring function involves different and overlapping duties, including
the board's reliance in good faith on others in the corporation.
Hence, a board's duty to remain informed is satisfied by its reliance on
officers and agents of the corporation, 139 as well as its assiduous re-
view of specific transactions.
While such may be the case under the Act, this did not occur with
the board in Van Gorkom.140 Consequently, the court found that the
have said that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the SEC regulations do provide new structure but
were simply a political reaction to give assurance to the public that the problems had been fixed.
William Ide, Post-Enron Corporate Governance Opportunities: Creating a Culture of Greater
Board Collaboration and Oversight, 54 MERCER L. REV. 829, 832 (2003). Hence, the primary
focus was on what was required to comply with the law and nothing more. Id.
136. The Act has been said to be unprecedented, because "in addition to regulating disclosure
and securities trading, the traditional jurisdiction of U.S. federal securities laws, the Act also
addresses matters of substantive corporate governance and executive fiduciary responsibility..."
Michael H. Hein et al., The Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002 Effects Sweeping Changes to the U.S.
Federal Securities Laws, GT ALERT (Greenberg Traurig, LLP), Aug. 2002, at 1. These duties
have historically been viewed as a prerogative of the states and self regulatory organizations
(SRO). Id.
137. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS,
2004: STATUTES, RULES, MATERIALS, AND FORMS, 1970 (2004).
138. SHu-ACQUAYE, supra note 57, at 585, 592.
139. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (e) (2004); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.42(b) (1998).
140. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875-81. The directors' defense that they also relied on the
advice of their counsel, Brennan, who informed them that they could be sued if they did not go
through with the transaction, did not exculpate the board. Id. The reason for this is that reliance
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board's general familiarity with the company's financial condition did
not provide a sufficient basis for its approval of the cash-out
merger. 141  In view of this, Van Gorkom reveals that generalized
knowledge is not enough to satisfy a board's duty to remain informed.
Even so, in the absence of gross negligence (business judgment rule
threshold), courts are generally reluctant to find directors in breach of
their duty of care, and the approach adopted to determine whether a
board has breached its duty of care has been relatively relaxed.
142
Simply put, because of the business judgment rule presumption that
board action is a product of good faith and should therefore be pro-
tected, unless the action is grossly egregious, the court's tendency is to
not interfere with or second guess a board's decision; the result is a
fairly lax standard of review. In fact, several studies have confirmed
this to be the trend in corporate America.
143
Has the Act changed this lax standard? On the one hand, the Act
seems to validate the requisite duty to be informed. 144 This is evi-
denced by the condition that the board is required to sign the com-
pany's annual report. The Act's requirement for a board to remain
informed, regarding accounting information, is also consistent with
cases like Van Gorkom, which require directors to obtain appropriate
information prior to making a business decision. 145 To that extent, the
Act does not add anything new to the customary standard of review.
in good faith does not mean blind reliance. Id. Rather, a reasonable basis for their reliance is
required. Id. The argument about the test conducted by Romans was also rejected on similar
basis. Id.
141. See Lisa Fairfax, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act as Confirmation of Recent Trends in Director
and Officer Fiduciary Obligations, 76 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 953, 961 (2002). Van Gorkom suggests
that corporate officials are not at liberty to supplant reliance for their own knowledge.
142. Id. at 960.
143. Id. "The foundation stone of the American law of corporate governance is currently
enunciated in the holdings (not the dicta) of the leading corporate states: there must be a mini-
mum of interference by the courts in internal corporate affairs. Except in the egregious case of
bad judgment or when there is evidence of bad faith, courts have made no attempts to second-
guess directors on the substantive soundness of decision reached." Id. (citing Charles Hansen,
The ALl Corporate Governance Project: Of the Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule, 41
Bus. LAW. 1237, 1239 (1986). Likewise, in "'[t]he search for cases in which directors of industrial
corporations have been held liable in derivative actions for negligence uncomplicated by self-
dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a very large haystack."' FAIRFAX, supra
note 142, at 960 n.38 (quoting Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New
Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099
(1968)).
144. Section 302 requires the CEO and CFO of a public company, in their quarterly and
annual report to guarantee the accuracy of the report, and to certify the accuracy of the com-
pany's financial statement, and that the company has adopted adequate internal controls. See
PARADES, supra note 134, at 516.
145. Likewise, in Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981), Mrs. Prichard and
her two sons were shareholders and directors of a reinsurance brokerage business. Id. at 818.
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On the other hand, in contrast to the conventional standard, section
301 of the Act clearly adds content to the director's duty to remain
informed. For example, the board of directors is required, through its
audit committee, to appoint and oversee the work of the accounting
firm employed by the corporation. 146 Also, in connection with its
oversight function, the audit committee is responsible for resolving
disagreements between management and the auditor regarding finan-
cial reporting. This responsibility for resolving disputes ensures that
the directors, who serve on the audit committee, take an active role in
the auditing process. 147 As a result, their knowledge about the pro-
cess and the company is enhanced, which heightens the content re-
quirement of the duty to be informed. 148 Given this, it appears that
mere reliance on other agents, or the excuse that one is not a specialist
would not constitute sufficient compliance with the Act's
requirements.
The Boards' responsibility to oversee public accounting firms also
suggests that directors have an affirmative duty to keep abreast of fi-
nancial information. Likewise, under section 302 of the Act, which
generally deals with Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports,
section 302 (a)(4), (A) and (B) require executive officers to establish
and maintain internal controls to ensure that material information is
made known to officers. This means that a laissez-fair attitude to-
wards corporate affairs is no longer tolerated; the CEO and CFO
must certify the effectiveness of the internal control procedures.
In this regard, the Act appears to provide fiduciary-like require-
ments for executives and thus more weight to the general duty to be
informed under the statutes and case law.149 Therefore, in light of the
Act's requirement that officers take responsibility for implementing
and maintaining internal controls, it could be argued that the Act has
evolved a step further than case law. 150
After the death of her husband, she became depressed and drank a lot, and basically paid no
attention to the business. Id. at 819-20. As a result the sons squandered and misappropriated
over 12 million dollars. See id. at 818-19. The court held she was in breach of her fiduciary duty
of care for failing to inquire and monitor the company. Id. at 829. Hence, if directors do not
have sufficient knowledge to make an informed decision, they should refuse to act or resign their
position.
146. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301.
147. See FAIRFAX, supra note 142, at 961.
148. See id.
149. Id. at 962.
150. Id. at 963. That such a corporate responsibility was rejected in the Delaware Supreme
Court case of Graham v Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963) (holding
that the officers of a corporation did not have an obligation to implement a system of
watchfulness).
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Then again, the decision In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litiga-
tion, long ago established this general rule.151 Because of this, it could
be said that it is really not an innovation under the Act after all. 152
Whatever one might conclude, the Act is applicable to all publicly
traded corporations and is not limited to a particular jurisdiction, as
the decision in Chalmers has made clear. Accordingly, a broader ap-
plication of the rule is effectuated. In this light, the board in Van
Gorkom would have found it even more difficult to defend its position
that it made an informed business decision, based upon its reliance on
material information afforded through its internal controls.
Also, in determining what impact, if any, the Act would have had
on the Van Gorkom decision, the general applicability of section 305
of the Act must also be considered. Section 305 expands the SEC's
ability to remove directors and officers and bar them from serving in
similar capacities at other public companies by demonstrating their
"unfitness. ' 153 Unfortunately, the proscription from serving as an of-
ficer or director is far-reaching, and fails to distinguish between be-
haviors that might rise to a finite-term suspension and those that
should give rise to a lifetime bar. 54
The core question then becomes, "to what extent did the director's
or officer's conduct fall outside the norms of professional conduct?"' 55
In considering this question, the degree of harm that resulted and the
level of contempt the director exhibited for the interests of the com-
151. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996)
152. In speaking about the duty to remain informed and interpreting Allis-Chalmers, the Del-
aware Court of Chancery found that "corporate boards [cannot] satisfy their obligation to be
reasonably informed.. .without assuring themselves that information and reporting systems exist
in the organization that are reasonably designed to provide to senior management and to the
board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to allow management and the board, each
within its scope, to reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation's compliance with
law and its business performance." In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. See also FAIRFAX, supra
note 142, at 971 (noting that the court today would not accept the formulation of Allis-Chambers
because the courts now require more exacting standards).
153. The Act does not define what unfitness is and the legislative history of the Act provides
no guidance either. Jayne W. Barnard, SEC Debarment of Officers and Directors After
Sarbanes-Oxley, 59 Bus. LAW. 391, 408 (2004). The prior standard required "substantial unfit-
ness." Id. It is also not clear from the legislative history that the change in language from "sub-
stantial unfitness" to "unfitness" was intended to reduce the quantum of proof required of the
government. Id. However, it has been propounded that it is more difficult to determine that
someone is "unfit" than it is to determine that the person is "substantially unfit;" in the same
way it is easier for a litigant to show substantial compliance with a statute than to show strict
compliance. Id.
154. Would it have been clearer if Congress delineated one standard of misconduct for sus-
pension and a higher standard of misconduct for lifetime bar? See generally id. at 412 for a
discussion of this issue.
155. Id. at 410.
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pany's investors is measured.1 56 Also, a determination is made con-
cerning the director's or officer's ability to rehabilitate. a57
In Van Gorkom, Romans, the CFO of Trans Union, was vehement
in his objection to the merger, 158 but he voted for it anyway.' 59 Had
he not voted and the minutes reflected his objection, would he have
been excused then and now under the Act? It appears from the
court's decision that Romans might have been excused, because the
court alluded to the fact that the directors took a unified position and
therefore were all liable. This implicitly means that had he distanced
himself from the decision by making a strong argument against the
merger, as well as voted against it, he might have been exonerated.
Romans also might have been exonerated under the Act, if his ob-
jection was noted and he did not vote to pass the resolution. In that
instance, he probably would not have been deemed unfit to serve on
the board of other public companies; his conduct about the market
test was far from clandestine.
However, today, it is more likely that Trans Union would have com-
plied with section 406 of the Act. This section directs the SEC to
adopt rules requiring a public company to disclose if it has adopted a
code of ethics for its senior financial officers or to explain why it had
not done so and to disclose immediately any waiver of or change in
the code of ethics.' 60 Under those circumstances, it is highly probable
that Trans Union would have forced Roman's hand to conform to the
ethical obligations circumscribed under the Act.
Conversely, neither Van Gorkom nor the other board members
could have been exonerated either then or now under the Act. Inter-
156. Id.
157. Id. Barnard also proposed that the courts, in making that determination, should con-
sider: "(i) whether the defendant had an understanding of the fiduciary role of an officer or
director; (ii) whether there is reason to believe that she is unable to perform that role profession-
ally and responsibly in a setting other than the setting in which her prior misconduct occurred;
(iii) whether she has expressed contrition for past misconduct and whether that expression is
credible; and (iv) whether carefully-drawn limitations, such as a prohibition against participating
in the preparation of financial documents or communicating with analysts or the public, might
serve to ensure that, if the defendant is hired as an officer or director, future misconduct will not
recur." Id.
158. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 884-85. Also, Romans and other senior management officials
were responsible for soliciting an alternate offer/ proposal (from KKR) for Trans Union to com-
pete with Pritzker's offer. Id. As expected, Van Gorkom was very unwelcoming to the proposal.
Id. Likewise, GE Credit Corporation's interests in Trans Union never blossomed into a formal
offer, due to the unwillingness of Pritzker to extend the February 10th deadline for Trans
Union's stockholders' meeting. Id.
159. Id.
160. My assumption here, of course is that he would still have the desire to object to the
consummation of such a merger based on fulfilling his ethical obligations.
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twined with the duty to be informed is the duty of inquiry. The duty
to inquire is triggered when: 61 a) corporate officials have knowledge
that a wrong doing has occurred; b) they have responsibility for ap-
proving specific documents; and c) during major corporate
transactions. 162
The Van Gorkom board failed to pose pertinent questions to Van
Gorkom and the other executives. 63 Given the magnitude of the de-
cision and the absence of substantial information related to that deci-
sion, the board's duty of inquiry was especially critical in this case. A
twenty minutes deliberation, prior to voting, could not have afforded
the board sufficient time to adequately deal with issues that should
have been raised earlier. This, of course, called into question the de-
gree of good faith the board exercised. Also, the board's conduct was
extremely far removed from the norms of professional conduct and
contemptuous to the company's shareholders. Therefore, under the
Act, each of the board members most likely would have been consid-
ered unfit to serve on the board of other public companies. 164
The dissent opined, that based solely on the their collective experi-
ence and sophistication, the board should not have been held liable.165
The dissent reasoned that the directors' level of experience alone was
a sufficient basis for them to reach their decision after an informed
and reasonable deliberation; directors of their caliber were not ordi-
narily taken by a "fast shuffle". 166
We also know from the composition of the Enron board, who had
comparable talents and expertise, 167 that the stature of the board and
its executives is not a basis to free them from negligent decisions or
failure to inquire. To that extent, the board would be disqualified
from serving on other boards due to their unfitness. As Van Gorkom
161. Note that Sarbanes-Oxley does not specifically impose upon management a duty to in-
quire; this is however implicit in the Act itself.
162. FAIRFAX, supra note 142, at 972.
163. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893.
164. Even when an attempt was made to amend the September 20th merger agreement, to
allow for competing bids, Pritzker presented the supposed amendment to Van Gorkom on Octo-
ber 10th, which Van Gorkom proceeded to countersign (alone) on behalf of Trans Union. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 833. Although Trans Union's board eventually approved the amended
version on a much later date (December 20th, the record did not appear to affirmatively estab-
lish that Trans Union's directors ever read the amendments. Id.
165. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 894-98.
166. Id. at 895.
167. The Enron board was comprised of a wide range of very qualified individuals with back-
grounds from business, finance, accounting and government. See PARADES, supra note 136, at
504 (providing a list and qualifications of Enron's directors in 2001). Also, the company had all
the committees one would want to see in a company of that kind. See id.
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and Enron suggest, exceptionally good board structuring does not
necessarily guarantee good results.
a. The Inside versus Outside Directors:
The Van Gorkom court suggested that directors may very well have
different litigation exposure. For example, outside directors might not
be liable for a board's decision if they were misled by inside directors
about the advisability of a decision that shareholders alleged was
made negligently. Inside directors often have better information and
are generally more knowledgeable about the business of the company
than outside directors. Also, because they typically have more at
stake, inside directors have a greater incentive to ensure the com-
pany's success. 168
The Van Gorkom decision also makes clear that, if directors take a
unified position in litigating a case, the court may properly treat the
directors as a unit and ignore possible distinctions between those di-
rectors who might otherwise have been considered loyal to the com-
pany. Hence, the court's judgment was blurred concerning whether
the outside directors in Van Gorkom should have been treated differ-
ently. In effect, the court sought to drive a wedge between directors
who were negligent or disloyal and those who were not.1 69
b. Board Independence
Within the last twenty years in this country, there has been an in-
creasing trend towards more outside directors on corporate boards of
directors, which is expected to result in a decreased proportion of in-
siders on boards. 170 The trend towards fewer inside directors was
sparked by the inclination to make boards more independent from
management. 17 ' Both the Act and the NYSE have fostered the notion
of more independent boardmembers through a mandatory board
composition requirement. 172 Is this requirement likely to enhance
corporate governance?
168. Although the converse is that insiders have a greater stake in the company, this makes
them more vulnerable to "cook the books." See generally PARADES, supra note 136, at 520.
169. CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER Busl-
NESS ASSOCIATIONS 109 (Teachers ed. 1999).
170. Proxy statement data for 1998 shows that corporate boards of public corporations in the
United States average eleven directors, with two inside directors. See Lynne L. Dallas, The Mul-
tiple Roles of Corporate Boards of Directors, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 781, 787 (2003).
171. Id. at 788.
172. In late May early June of 2002, NASDAQ and NYSE both announced they would be
making recommendations to their respective boards of directors to adopt additional corporate
governance listing standards. See IDE, supra note 136, at 845. NASDAQ's rules were primarily
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Section 301 of the Act requires that NYSE and NASDAQ listed
companies have an audit committee 173 comprised solely of indepen-
dent directors.174 In order for a director to be considered indepen-
dent, he or she may not receive any fees from the company, other than
a director or committee fee, or otherwise be an affiliated person of the
company or any of its subsidiaries. 175
The NYSE has substantively regulated corporate governance
through its listing standards. After Enron and the other corporate
scandals, the NYSE proposed extensive amendments to its listing
standards which would effectively augment its regulatory authority
over corporate boards of directors. 176 The proposed amendments
would require that the board of directors of companies listed on the
NYSE be primarily comprised of independent directors. A more
stringent definition of what constitutes an independent director was
also proposed. In order for a director to be "independent," the direc-
tor cannot have a "material relationship" with the company, which
includes commercial, industrial, banking, consulting, legal, accounting,
charitable, or familial relationships.177 Additional restrictions are also
imposed upon directors who seek status as an independent. 78 Given
limited to addressing shareholder approval of stock option plans, a restrictive definition of inde-
pendence, and audit committee approval of related party transactions. Id. NYSE, on the other
hand, took a more definitive first step of publishing its Recommendations of its Corporate Ac-
countability and Listing Standards on June 6, 2002. Id. at 845-46.
I am however, only discussing the NYSE standard listings. Following the signing of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act into law by the President, on July 30, 2002, NASDAQ & NYSE took addi-
tional steps to ensure that their proposed listing standards did not conflict with the provisions of
the Act. Id. at 850. In NASDAQ's case, the standards were expanded to include additional and
more comprehensive proposals that were more in line with NYSE proposals. Id.
173. The number of public companies that now have audit committees that are composed of
outside directors illustrates the increasing focus on manager monitoring by U.S. boards. A 1998
proxy statement revealed that all public corporations have audit committees with an average of
zero insiders on these committees. DALLAS, supra note 170, at 789. The audit committee is
intended to implement and support the boards' manager-monitoring function. Id.
174. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301.
175. Id.
176. See PARADES, supra note 136, at n.26. See Corporate Governance Rule Proposals Re-
flecting Recommendations from NYSE Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Com-
mittee as Approved by The New York Stock Exchange Board of Directors August 1, 2002 (No.
SR -NYSE-2002-33, filed Aug. 16, 2002).
177. See PARADES, supra note 136, at n.26.
178. Id. (1) Receives, or has an immediate family member who receives, more than $100,000
per year in compensation from the company, other than director and committee fees and pen-
sion or other forms of deferred compensation; (2) is affiliated with or employed by, or has an
immediate family member who is affiliated with or employed in a professional capacity by, a
present or former internal or external auditor of the company; (3) is employed, or has an imme-
diate family member who is employed, as an executive officer of another company where any of
the listed company's present executives serves on the other company's compensation committee;
or (4) is an executive officer or an employee, or has an immediate family member who is an
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these extensive constraints, it is questionable whether there are any
directors who currently serve on the board of companies thus listed
who would qualify as an independent director.
The proposed amendments also require that regular meetings of the
independent directors occur outside the presence of management di-
rectors. 179 Also, independent directors would receive independent
compensation and shareholder approval would be required for equity-
based compensation plans. 180 The amendments also propose that in-
dependent directors maintain separate nominating and audit commit-
tees. 18' The proposed amendments also make it mandatory for
independent directors to establish corporate governance guidelines
and codes of conduct. 182
Rather than discuss the merits of the proposed amendments as it
relates to independent directors, the pros and cons of an independent
board of directors will be discussed.
c. Concerns with the Independent Board Requirement
The regulations are quite inexorable and treat all companies and all
boards as if they were alike; while a "one size fits all" approach was
adopted in practice, in effect distinct differences result, simply because
not all boards and companies are the same.
The role of a board of directors is basically threefold; there is a
monitoring role, managerial role, and resource role. Different compa-
nies have different needs and the function that a board will be re-
quired to perform, from time to time, varies from company to
company. 83 Consequently, in subjecting all public companies to the
requirements proposed by the amendments, the most efficient out-
come may not result.
Perhaps, instead of both Congress and NYSE making the rules
mandatory,184 they could, alternatively, adopt a set of default rules,
executive officer, of another company (a) that accounts for at least two percent or $1 million,
whichever is greater, of the listed company's consolidated gross revenues or (b) for which the
listed company accounts for a least two percent or $1 million, whichever is greater, of the other
company's consolidated gross revenues. Id. In no event will a current employee of the company
be considered independent. Id.
179. See IDE, supra note 136, at n.64 (citing New York Stock Exchange, Corporate Account
Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee Report (June 6, 2002).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. PARADES, supra note 136, at 520.
184. Most corporate governance commentators recommend that a board of directors of a pub-
lic company should be composed of a substantial majority of independent directors. In referring
to director's independence, the committee emphasized that deference should be given to a
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which would give corporations an ability to opt out-even if doing so
would require a supermajority vote of shareholders. 185
At the end of the day, the director's independence equates to the
director's state of mind and willingness to act objectively and stand up
against management. Thus, as has been suggested, the true test of a
director's independence is whether she is willing to resign if need
be.186
In requiring that a board be comprised of more independent direc-
tors and by tightening the definition of "independent," the pool of
potential directors has been substantially narrowed. This could have
the effect of compromising the board in all of its duties. Also, the
NYSE definition of "independent director" seems to have made it vir-
tually impossible to find the right person who does not have some
affiliation with the company that would disqualify him or her. As a
result, the limited pool of choices does not make the position competi-
tive enough. Hence, the best qualified persons may be qualified in
form rather than in substance. This is a compromise which the board
may, at some point, have to pay for.
Moreover, although monitoring is quintessential for successful cor-
porate governance, too much monitoring may deprive the board of a
degree of collegiality, openness, and trust. As directors become more
independent, they are likely to become more adversarial vis-A-vis top
managers and each other.187 At the same time, active board oversight
could make management too risk adverse. Likewise, an aggressive
monitoring board might deter qualified people from serving as officers
of public corporations. However, if other monitoring devices were
present, such as market pressures, or active (institutional) shareholder
bases, then an active monitoring board becomes less important. 188
In order for monitoring to be effective, the focus should be on the
independence of the board's chairperson or lead directors; this is be-
cause board leadership by independent directors could have a positive
broader judicial standard of disinterestedness that will be applied by a court in review. See
Corporate Director's Guidebook, 59 Bus. LAW. 1057, 1101 (4th ed. 2004). Therefore, the wide
range of business and personal relationships between potential director and the corporation, as
well as its senior managers, would be taken into consideration. See id.
185. See PARADES, supra note 136, at 536. Even if an independent board is the answer, the
definition of independence in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the proposed listing standards is
problematic, because the definition of independent has been expanded to cover certain financial
and business ties that in the past were not understood as compromising a director's
independence.
186. PARADES, supra note 136, at 522.
187. "Constructive tension" is good for business, but animosity and distrust are not. PA-
RADES, supra note 136, at 521.
188. PARADES, supra note 136, at 521.
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effect on the social dynamics of the board.189 The genuine question
then becomes whether independent directors are truly independent. 190
Notwithstanding this, the danger of placing too much power in the
hands of one person, whether or not he or she is independent, should
not be undermined. Generally, the power broker is an individual who
is the CEO and or chairman of a company.
It is also noteworthy that the "independent" character or nature of
a person has little, if anything, to do with her role as an independent
director. For example, Enron's CEO, Jeff Skilling, was described by
an officer of the company as "... a creature of his own creation who
had became more intolerant, more opinionated, more bombastic, who
was always right, and got worse; he had a little bit of God
syndrome." 191
Also, even though independent boards of directors are desirable
and are now even more recommended, it has been argued that the
independence of outside directors is diminished when they serve on
boards with inside directors. 192 Studies show a correlation between
the capacity to exert influence and one's position in a hierarchical so-
cial structure. Similarly, psychological studies on group behavior indi-
cate that members of a group operate under social pressures that
encourage conformity to the group, or a lack of objectivity. 93 There-
fore, being "independent," in the true sense of the word, makes it trite
to say that the socialization process of board members, as well as the
influence generally exerted by the CEO over the board, denies direc-
tors true independence.
Moreover, a director who holds multiple directorships, and who
also serves as an executive officer on another company's board, may
not wish to be monitored as scrupulously in his position as executive
officer. This factor could potentially compromise the director's ability
to effectively monitor the governance of the company.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the foregoing discussion weighed some of the pros
and cons of the Act with deference given to the Van Gorkom case.
189. DALLAS, supra note 170, at 792-93. A 1999 survey of public corporations showed that
only 9% of responding corporations had independent director chairpersons, 30% had lead direc-
tors and the rest of the corporations had no plans to implement either of the two. 1d. at 793.
190. In Enron, for example, it turned out that many of the outside directors were not indepen-
dent, as they were benefiting from various kinds of financial relationships with Enron. See DAL-
LAS, supra note 170, at 794.
191. See DALLAS, supra note 170, at 817.
192. See id. at 787-88.
193. Id. at 804.
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In general, the Act has the advantage of boosting investors' confi-
dence. More importantly, the Act represents positive development in
corporate governance; it validates trends that impose more stringent
obligations on corporate managers by providing exacting standards of
conduct.1 94 Because the Act contains severe criminal sanctions and
other provisions for directors and officers who violate their fiduciary
obligations to the company and its stakeholders, the Act may serve to
deter violations of the fiduciary duty of care and thereby enhance cor-
porate governance as a whole.195 In outlining the manner in which
control mechanisms should be developed, the Act also highlights how
corporate managers could satisfy their obligations.
196
On the other hand, some argue that the Act simply mimics existing
case law and, therefore, does not add anything substantively new to
the fiduciary duty owed by directors.1 97 Additionally, the Act is a
"one size fits all" rule which fails to consider that companies are dif-
ferent and their needs vary. Therefore, the Act may not be as effec-
tive as it should be in accomplishing its main objective.
Furthermore, the Act encroaches upon the states' power to regulate
corporations registered within its jurisdictions; the Act creates the im-
pression that it is nothing more than a back door approach to feder-
ally regulate corporate governance in this country. In other words,
the Act marks an expanded role for Congress to substantively regu-
late corporate governance in the United States.198 Although corpo-
rate governance has been the province of state law which is subject to
public scrutiny under the disclosure requirements of the federal secur-
ities laws, parts of the Act and the SEC regulations are helpful addi-
tions to the disclosure requirements. However, other parts are said to
be cumbersome intrusions into areas in which state law has greater
expertise and abilities. 199 The rationale that state law should govern
stems from the fact that "corporations are creatures of state law" and
states have traditionally regulated this area.
200
Only time will tell whether the regulatory response is a permanent
solution to governance problems as it relates to the fiduciary duty of
194. See generally FAIRFAX, supra note 142, at 977.
195. Section 906 imposes a $1 million fine, 10 years in prison, or both for persons who know-
ingly violate the certification requirement and a $5 million fine, 20 years in prison or both for
willful violation of provision. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906.
196. FAIRFAX, supra ncte 142, at 977.
197. Id.
198. PARADES, supra note 136, at 531.
199. IDE, supra note 136, at 834.
200. PARADES, supra note 136, at 533.
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company directors. 201 Nevertheless, one thing that is certain is that
some kind of congressional response to corporate scandals is better
than no response at all.
201. As one author said, the "new regulatory and legislative reforms may be based upon the
mistaken belief that imperfect governments may be remedied... time will tell if the measures
enacted to address corporate governance deficiencies have not themselves created corporate
governance inefficiencies..." John F. Olson & Michael T. Adams, Composing a Balanced and
Effective Board to Meet New Governance Mandates, 59 Bus. LAW. 421, 451 (2004).
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